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Abstract
Background: Procedural and documentation deviations relating to intravenous (IV) infusion administration can have
important safety consequences. However, research on such deviations is limited. To address this we investigated the
prevalence of procedural and documentation deviations in IV infusion administration and explored variability in policy
and practice across different hospital trusts.
Methods: We conducted a mixed methods study. This involved observations of deviations from local policy including
quantitative and qualitative data, and focus groups with clinical staff to explore the causes and contexts of deviations.
The observations were conducted across five clinical areas (general medicine, general surgery, critical care, paediatrics
and oncology day care) in 16 National Health Service (NHS) trusts in England. All infusions being administered at the
time of data collection were included. Deviation rates for procedural and documentation requirements were compared
between trusts. Local data collectors and other relevant stakeholders attended focus groups at each trust. Policy details
and reasons for deviations were discussed.
Results: At least one procedural or documentation deviation was observed in 961 of 2008 IV infusions (deviation rate
47.9%; 95% confidence interval 45.5–49.8%). Deviation rates at individual trusts ranged from 9.9 to 100% of infusions,
with considerable variation in the prevalence of different types of deviation. Focus groups revealed lack of policy
awareness, ambiguous policies, safety and practicality concerns, different organisational priorities, and wide variation in
policies and practice relating to prescribing and administration of IV flushes and double-checking.
Conclusions: Deviation rates and procedural and documentation requirements varied considerably between hospital
trusts. Our findings reveal areas where local policy and practice do not align. Some policies may be impractical and lack
utility. We suggest clearer evidence-based standardisation and local procedures that are contextually practical to
address these issues.
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Background
Intravenous (IV) medication, which includes both infu-
sions and bolus doses, is associated with high rates of
preparation and administration errors [1, 2]. A system-
atic review suggests IV doses are associated with five
times more errors than non-IV doses [3]. IV infusion ad-
ministration is thus a serious safety concern [4], with
numerous policies and procedures in place at every hos-
pital with the aim of reducing the risk of harm.
In 2007, recommendations were made in a Patient Safety
Alert for England and Wales to reduce errors in injectable
medicines, including risk-assessing procedures and prod-
ucts, reviewing protocols, providing technical information,
competency-based training, and conducting an annual
medicines management audit [5]. It highlighted how pro-
cedures should be “clearly documented, reflect local cir-
cumstances and describe safe practice that all practitioners
can reasonably be expected to achieve. Patient safety inci-
dents commonly result where procedures are absent, in-
complete or where staff do not follow written procedures
due to a lack of awareness, insufficient knowledge or be-
cause they do not agree with them and routinely violate
them” ([5], page 3). Ten years on from this alert, it is not
known whether and how health care organisations have
adapted their procedures in light of this advice or how well
these procedures are adhered to in practice.
Research into procedural and documentation deviations
of IV infusion administration is also limited. Husch et al.
[6] included procedural and documentation errors in their
study of 426 IV infusions in a US hospital; this study
found two of the most prevalent error types to be no rate
on the additive label, affecting 46% of infusions, and pa-
tient identification (ID) issues, affecting 13% of infusions.
Schnock et al. [7] used a similar method across ten US
hospitals to examine 1164 IV infusions and reported 60%
of infusions with an additive label that deviated from pol-
icy, 35% of infusions where giving sets were not labelled
according to policy, and 0.2% of infusions where the pa-
tient had no ID wristband. No studies have investigated
procedural and documentation deviations in the UK and
none have explored the surrounding context or possible
reasons for the discrepancies identified.
This study therefore aims to investigate the prevalence
of procedural and documentation deviations related to
IV infusion administration as part of a larger study of IV
medication administration practices across 16 NHS
trusts in England [4], and to explore variability in policy
and practice across these trusts.
Methods
Study design
We used a mixed methods exploratory sequential design
[8]. An adapted quantitative point-prevalence method,
based on previous studies in this field, [6, 7] focused on
‘what’ and ‘how many’ deviations occurred in practice.
This was followed by debriefs with observers and focus
groups with key stakeholders to explore ‘why’ they
occurred. The study protocol was published previously
[4] and approved by an NHS Research Ethics Committee
(14/SC/0290).
Study setting and sample
We recruited 16 trusts (NHS organisations) in England.
Using a purposive sampling strategy we selected hospi-
tals that had a diverse range of IV infusion practices and
differed in terms of type, size, geographic location, pa-
tient safety metrics, and use of infusion devices and
smart pump technology [4]. We conducted observations
in five clinical areas: general medicine, general surgery,
critical care, paediatrics and oncology day care. Eight
trusts conducted observations in all five areas; five
conducted the study in the first three areas only; two
specialist children’s trusts collected paediatric data only;
and one trust collected oncology day care data only.
Most trusts conducted the study at one hospital; the
trust that collected only oncology day care data did so at
specialist cancer units on three different hospital sites:
18 hospital sites were therefore included in total.
Observational data collection
Each participating trust had a pair of observers (typically
a nurse and a pharmacist) employed in that trust who
collected data for about 1 day in each clinical area. Stan-
dardised training was provided to all observers.
Observers compared each infusion that was running at
the time of observation against the prescription, local
policies and guidance [4]. Infusion preparation and set
up were not observed. Observers also consulted clinical
staff as needed to better understand the context of any
deviations. Infusions included any medication, fluids,
blood products and nutrition administered via an IV in-
fusion, including patient-controlled analgesia. Bolus
doses were excluded, except where a prescribed bolus
was given as an infusion, or vice versa. Infusions that
were completed were excluded even if connected to the
patient. Patients were not included in the study if, for
example, they were in isolation due to infection risks,
were receiving care that would have required interrup-
tion at the time of observation, or were away from the
clinical area (such as to have an X-ray).
Observers recorded data using a standardised paper form,
which was then entered into a secure web-based data collec-
tion tool [9] and checked for consistency by the research
team. No patient identifiable data were recorded. Suspected
medication and documentation errors were raised with clin-
ical staff so they could be corrected if needed; usual hospital
practices for reporting errors were then followed.
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Identifying procedural or documentation deviations
We specified four types of procedural and documenta-
tion deviations a priori [4]: 1) giving sets not labelled
appropriately; 2) documentation of administration in-
accurate or incomplete; 3) infusion additive labels miss-
ing, incomplete or incorrect; and 4) patient ID
wristbands missing or with incorrect, illegible or missing
information. For each of these deviations, we collected
both quantitative and qualitative data. Observers were
encouraged to record any other deviations that did not
fit within these types. We identified two further types of
deviation where policies varied among trusts: 5) pre-
scription and administration of IV flushes, and 6) proce-
dures for the double checking of medication. For these
latter categories, we present qualitative data only be-
cause they were not observed systematically but emerged
in the debriefs and focus groups.
Multiple deviations could occur in each infusion, e.g. a
missing giving set label and an incomplete additive label
could affect the same infusion. We here report data on
procedural and documentation deviations. Data on
deviations relating to medication administration will be
reported in a separate paper.
Debrief and focus group data collection
Following observational data collection at each trust, a
report was drafted summarising that trust’s data. This
was presented at a debrief meeting with the observers,
providing an opportunity to clarify aspects of the pol-
icies, practices and deviations observed. These clarifica-
tions sometimes led to updates to the data; e.g., one site
realised that giving set labels in their critical care unit
were not compliant with their policy because they did
not include the date the infusion was set up; another site
initially included some infusions that were completed
but were still connected to the patient so these were
subsequently excluded. Focus groups were then con-
ducted with other local stakeholders to contextualise the
findings, explore details of policies and practices and
reasons for deviations, and discuss implications of the
findings. Debriefs and focus groups were audio recorded
and transcribed verbatim. Guides for debrief and focus
group sessions can be found as a supplementary file to
this paper (i.e., Additional file 1).
Data management and analysis
Procedural and documentation deviation rates were cal-
culated as the proportion of infusions with at least one
deviation, using total opportunities for error (TOE: total
number of doses administered, plus any omitted doses)
as the denominator (see Tables 1, 2, 3). However, policy
requirements were particularly unevenly distributed in
some areas. Here split charts were used to present the
variability of local policy requirements (left hand side),
and deviation rates calculated as the proportion of infu-
sions with at least one deviation using TOE as the total
number of doses administered where local requirements
applied as the denominator (right hand side) (see Figs. 1
and 3). Debrief and focus group data were analysed in-
ductively, and used to contextualise the quantitative data
and provide explanatory detail about issues within and
across trusts.
Results
Data were collected on 2008 infusions administered or
prescribed to 1326 patients between April 2015 and
December 2016. Overall, 961 infusions (47.9%) had at
least one procedural or documentation deviation. The
prevalence of deviations varied considerably among trusts,
affecting between 9.9 and 100% of infusions (Table 1).
Trusts’ deviation profiles also varied, with some having
greater numbers of certain types (Tables 2 and 3).
Giving set labelling
Deviations in giving set labelling affected 26.8% of in-
fusions. Deviations affected 16.7 to 100% of infusions
that required a giving set label across trusts (Fig. 1).
Deviations affecting giving set labelling were common
at Trusts D, G, H, K and P. Rates of deviation were
affected by both the level of detail required by local
policy and clinicians’ policy awareness. For example,
at Trust D, infusions in all areas except critical care
were generally non-compliant; observers only learned
that their hospital policy required all IV giving sets to
be labelled in the closing stages of data collection,
despite being asked to familiarise themselves with
relevant policy prior to data collection. In their de-
brief meeting, observers reported that this require-
ment was within their peripheral cannula policy and
that they had not been able to find it initially. At
Trust P, giving sets were only labelled in critical care
when this was needed to differentiate between drugs,
but their policy explicitly stated that all IV lines must
be labelled with the time and date they were con-
nected to the patient; none were labelled with this in-
formation. Trust K, which had the most
comprehensive giving set labelling requirements, also
had a high rate of non-compliance (83.5% of infu-
sions); their policy required all IV lines to be labelled
with the name and strength of the medicine, route of
administration, diluent and final volume, patient’s
name, expiry date and time, and name of practitioner
preparing the medicine. Patient Safety Alert 20 [5]
does not specify whether or not giving sets need to
be labelled.
Eight of the 16 trusts (Trusts B, C, E, I, J, L, M
and N) had no trust-wide requirements for labelling
giving sets and so had no or low rates of labelling
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deviations, e.g. Trust B only had policy requirements
that applied to critical care. Some trusts required all
IV giving sets to be labelled whereas others were
more selective. Focus group participants agreed that
there were two main reasons for labelling giving sets:
1) to distinguish between multiple giving sets, and 2)
to indicate when giving sets need to be changed.
Trusts A and O had designed their policy to directly
address these points, i.e. “staff had to label giving sets
only where more than one was in use and to date
them for continuous infusions that would need to be
changed.”
Documentation deviations
Deviations in documenting IV administration affected
16.7% of infusions, ranging from 4.6 to 36.5% across in-
dividual trusts (Fig. 2). Failure to document the start
time was the most common problem. Other less fre-
quent but potentially more troublesome issues were dis-
covered during the observations. In some cases,
administration was not documented at all. In one case,
20 mmol potassium chloride in a litre of 0.9% sodium
chloride was prescribed, but the trust did not stock this
formulation. Instead, staff administered two infusion bags
of 500 ml 0.9% sodium chloride, with 20 mmol potassium
Fig. 2 Policy deviations relating to documentation of medication administration
Fig. 1 Variation in giving set label policy and deviations where a label is required among trusts
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chloride in one of them. However, poor documentation
meant it was not clear that this prescription was split
across two bags and which was being given first. Patient
Safety Alert 20 [5] recommends making a detailed record
of the administration as soon as possible after administra-
tion but does not give more detailed directions.
Additive label deviations
Deviations in recording required details on the additive
label affected 10.9% of all infusions. Deviations affected
3.3 to 74.0% of infusions that required an additive label
across trusts (Fig. 3). Policy requirements affected differ-
ent proportions of infusions at trusts (Fig. 3). For ex-
ample, at Trust J, 78% of infusions were standard fluids
with no additives, and these did not require a label. Fur-
thermore, not all trusts specified the information re-
quired on additive labels in the relevant policy but there
seemed to be an implicit expectation in all trusts that
nurses should complete parts of the additive labels. Most
additive label deviations were considered low risk by ob-
servers and focus group participants, such as missing
batch numbers for licensed non-biological medications.
Trust K had a high deviation rate; their written policy
required the most information to be documented on
their additive labels: patient’s name, ward/clinical area,
drug, final concentration and volume, administration
rate, total amount of drug added to the syringe or bag,
batch number and details of the medication added [dilu-
ent, date prepared, time prepared, expiry date, expiry
time, route of administration]. This is more detailed than
the Patient Safety Alert 20 [5] recommendations of name
of medicine, strength, route of administration, diluent and
final volume, patient’s name, expiry date and time, and the
name of the practitioner preparing the medicine.
Trust B’s policy required nurses to record batch num-
ber on additive labels. However, nurses at the focus
group raised objections about the utility of doing this: e.
g., for short infusions that would be thrown away after
20 min. They suggested that a better place to record
batch numbers (if necessary) would be in the patient’s
medical records where this information would be more
permanent. One nurse suggested that some medications
come with a removable batch number sticker that could
be stuck in the patient’s notes. Trust D focus group par-
ticipants said they had had no detailed additive label re-
quirements written into policy, did not expect the batch
number to be commonly completed on the label, and
wondered if the labels should be redesigned without the
section for batch numbers.
Potentially significant deviations included an additive
label only marked ‘DEX’, which referred to dexamethasone
but could be confused with dextrose or other drugs; and a
completely unlabelled syringe of fentanyl that was in a syr-
inge driver. Other additive label deviations were initially
suspected to be medication errors but on further investi-
gation they were solely documentation issues. For ex-
ample, observers found a 1000 mg bottle of paracetamol
infusing into a patient prescribed 675 mg. However, the
nurse reported they had removed 325 mg before setting
Fig. 3 Variation in additive label policy and deviations where a label is required among trusts
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up the infusion, so the patient would receive the correct
amount. The observers pointed out that the bottle was
not labelled to indicate that this had been done, but the
nurses said it was usual practice to remove the excess dose
and not label these changes on that ward. Patient Safety
Alert 20 [5] makes no recommendations for the process
of removing excess dose but does recommend labels are
used for medicines prepared in clinical areas and that de-
tailed records of administration are made.
Patient identification deviations
The percentage of infusions with a patient ID deviation
varied between clinical areas: general surgery (2.5%); crit-
ical care (2.5%); general medicine (5.1%); paediatrics (9.
9%), and oncology day care (10.3%). Patient Safety Alert
20 [5] recommends patient ID and details are checked in
accordance with local policy. Safer Practice Notice 11 [10]
recommends all hospital inpatients in acute settings
should wear ID wristbands.
The deviation rate relating to ID wristbands was 5.8%
overall, ranging from 0.0 to 16.9% across trusts (Fig. 4).
Trust F was fully compliant, which may be because this
trust had prioritised this area and had been auditing this
practice prior to our study. Trust C was the only trust
where the policy stated that patients receiving IV infu-
sions in oncology day care were not required to wear ID
wristbands. The oncology day care manager at Trust B
reported ongoing problems with wristband compliance
in oncology day care, although local policy required ID
wristbands. She perceived that it was difficult to change
staff behaviour and reported technical problems with the
printer required for patient ID wristbands.
Variability in IV flush policies
Most trusts had a patient group direction (PGD) to allow
nurses to administer small volume flushes (e.g. 1-20 ml of
sodium chloride 0.9%) without a patient-specific medica-
tion order. Oncology day care units sometimes used larger
flushes that would need a separate prescription if it fell
outside the limits of the PGD (e.g. up to 250 ml or 500 ml
across a series of infusions). However, at Trust K’s oncol-
ogy day care unit, such larger volumes were administered
without a prescription or PGD; this practice was deemed
acceptable by their haematology and oncology care over-
sight groups. Trust D had an electronic prescribing system
that automatically included larger flushes in its chemo-
therapy regimens, although one flush was observed run-
ning but missing from the medication order.
The issue of whether to flush the whole giving set or
just the IV access device arose at a number of trusts. For
example, at Trust P, a nurse had prepared a 100 ml bag
of 0.9% sodium chloride which was not prescribed and
was beyond the 20 ml PGD limit, to flush between giv-
ing omeprazole and furosemide infusions. The nurse
intended to flush the whole giving set to ensure the
whole dose was administered and to avoid manipulating
the connection with the access device. This was noted as
unusual practice by Trust P observers, who reported
that the first giving set would usually be detached, the
access device flushed and then a new giving set con-
nected for the second drug. However, some focus group
participants recognised that this may lead to partial infu-
sions as some of the dose will remain in the giving set.
Patient Safety Alert 20 [5] recommends flushing the ac-
cess device before and after administration.
Fig. 4 Policy deviations relating to patient identification
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Variability in double checking policies
Patient Safety Alert 20 [5] recommends double checking
systems, e.g. an independent check or smart pump tech-
nology, but it does not go into detail about how these
should be done. Different single, double, independent
and second checking procedures were required for IV
infusions at different trusts. Trusts A and O explicitly
permitted single checking for IVs except for specified
high risk drugs, specific situations and controlled drugs.
For example, Trust O’s policy required staff to double
check prior to administration of chemotherapy. In con-
trast, Trust G’s policy required staff to double check all
stages of preparation and administration from cupboard
to bedside, although there was acknowledgment in the
focus group that this was not always practical. The
wording of double checking policies at some trusts im-
plied that this was ‘required’ whereas others seemed
more flexible with wording such as ‘where possible’.
During the focus group, nurses and pharmacists at Trust
P recognised that the wording of their policy was am-
biguous, in that the policy was intended to mean that a
second clinician signs to confirm that the right patient
was receiving the right drug with the correct pump set-
tings, whereas the nursing staff who attended the focus
group thought the second signatory was only confirming
the contents of the bag or syringe. Trust P pharmacy
staff also wanted to move away from the concept of a
‘second checker,’ as this terminology suggested it could
be less important and only a confirmatory role, and
move towards a ‘second administrator’ who was equally
accountable and would be expected to do a thorough in-
dependent check. Trust I was the only trust to have a
separate detailed appendix to their main policy to specify
what an independent double check involved.
Discussion
Almost one in two infusions had at least one deviation
from local policy. Adherence to procedural requirements
varied markedly, and it was difficult to make compari-
sons across sites due to wide variation in local policies,
as recently reported in the USA [7]. Most participating
trusts had a lower prevalence of deviations relating to
additive labels and patient ID than the hospital studied
by Husch et al. [6] and fewer additive label and giving
set labelling deviations compared to Schnock et al. [7].
We found a higher prevalence of deviations involving
patient ID wristbands, compared to 0.2% of infusions re-
corded by Schnock et al. [7]. The inclusion of oncology
day care units and paediatrics in our study exacerbated
this difference because of their higher deviation rates
compared to other clinical areas.
Patient Safety Alert 20 [5] highlighted the importance
of designing adequate and pragmatic procedures for IV
safety. Ten years on, this is the first study to investigate
the state of IV infusion administration policy and prac-
tice in England. High deviation rates at some trusts sug-
gest that policies may have become decoupled from
practice. This can be considered as a widening gap be-
tween work-as-imagined (policies) and work-as-done
(practices) [11]. Observers and staff at some trusts were
unaware of the details of their policies prior to taking
part in the study. At worst, written procedures can be-
come decontextualised ‘fantasy documents’ [12] that
protect the organisation; at best, they can be important
resources for action if designed, managed and used ap-
propriately [13].
Overall, variability in policy among trusts suggests that
more national guidance and standardisation is needed to
help trusts devise appropriate IV infusion policies. We
identified clear lack of consensus about whether and
how giving sets should be labelled, requirements for
additive labels, and procedures for flushing. There was
also a wide variation in double checking, with little evi-
dence to guide the development of policy [14–17].
Related to the issue of devising adequate and prag-
matic policy is compliance with such policy. Staff some-
times object to requirements that they perceive to be
too onerous, or that they find impractical, as illustrated
by Trust K having the most prescriptive policy and one
of the highest rates of deviations. Staff can face conflict
when they are expected to be both efficient and thor-
ough, while policy writers may fail to appreciate the de-
mands of clinical practice [13, 18]. It can also be
challenging for practitioners and researchers to deter-
mine what is a deviation and what is recommended
practice due to the variability in policy between clinical
areas and sites. For example, the nurse who planned to
flush the whole giving set rather than just the access de-
vice was following good practice in one clinical area, but
this would have been deemed a deviation in another.
Patient Safety Alert 20 [5] is clear that practical proce-
dures play an important role in safety, as we highlight in
the introduction. However, it is difficult to comment on
which deviations are safe and which are unsafe, especially
when local policy is variable and some requirements are
not deemed practical. If a deviation actively contributed to
harm it is obviously unsafe, but not contributing to harm in
a given patient does not mean that it is ‘safe’. For example,
some seemingly safe deviations could have contributed to
harm in combination with other circumstances, e.g. a miss-
ing ID band could contribute to a patient receiving the
wrong drug or a nurse could put up 1000 mg paracetamol
intending to stop it early to give a smaller dose, only for an
agency nurse to finish the whole bottle in line with standard
practice elsewhere.
Annual audits of injectable medicine practice were rec-
ommended by Patient Safety Alert 20 [5], but auditing IV
infusion administration practice was not common across
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our participating trusts. Many trusts reported auditing in-
fection control requirements and the prescribing of IV in-
fusions, but not their administration. This may account for
staff at some trusts being surprised by the requirements of
their own policies and the extent of local deviations. More
widespread local audits would reveal issues specific to
those trusts, and encourage staff to review issues where
policy and practice do not align. These misalignments
should be seen as opportunities for organisational learning
to reduce the gap between work-as-imagined (policies) and
work-as-done (practices) [11]. We would encourage a
stance of ‘understanding’ rather than ‘enforcement’ so that
practical policies can be devised [13].
A strength of this study is the mixed method approach
used to find out both what deviations occurred, and
why. However, we did not attempt to analyse whether
deviations were intentional or unintentional; this would
require interviews with the staff concerned and is an
area for further research. A limitation of our study is
that there could be differences among pairs of observers,
either in their data collection or in their interpretation
and knowledge of local policy. We trained all observers
to minimise such effects. Some trusts suggested that
staffing levels and workload could affect the prevalence
of deviations, but we did not collect these data; this
could be explored in future studies. Given the variability
of local policy discovered in this study, a systematic ana-
lysis of hospital policy documents would be fruitful, ex-
ploring their variation as well as their adherence to the
recommendations in Patient Safety Alert 20. Overall, na-
tional efforts are required to identify common standards
that balance practicality and patient safety concerns.
Conclusion
We identified considerable variability in local policies and
in procedural and documentation deviation rates. This is
particularly concerning given that these risks were
highlighted 10 years ago. Some trusts have policies that
seem very onerous while others lack policies in certain
areas, and are operating outside formal guidance and le-
gislation. Some have policies that are not widely known
among staff, or policies that are known but not followed.
Standardisation of evidence-based policy is needed as well
as better alignment of policies with what is possible in
routine clinical practice. Furthermore, active systematic
implementation of policy is needed with regular auditing
to monitor the alignment between policy and practice.
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